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PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: THE PROSPECT OF
OVER OR UNDERCOMPENSATION IN DAMAGE
AWARDS FOR PERSONAL INJURIES
Michael H. Graham*
To determine damage awards for the personal injury plaintiff,
the Pattern Jury Instructions now used by several states itemize the
compensable elements of damage. Application of such elements
often leads to exclusion of appropriate elements or to duplication of
appropriate elements with the inequitable result of overcompensa-
tion or undercompensation. To combat this, Professor Graham
provides a viable framework for analyzing the elements which mea-
sure the damages suffered. He proposes a set of pattern jury in-
structions which incorporates the compensable elements and facili-
tates jury deliberation. Finally he illustrates the improved instruc-
tions by applying them to a hypothetical plaintiff.
Damage awards in personal injury actions attempt to compensate the
plaintiff for the damages caused by the negligence or wrongful conduct of
the defendant. The primary goal is to make the plaintiff as nearly whole as
possible by an award of money. 1 Punitive damages are awarded only when
a defendant's action constitutes a wrong more flagrant than ordinary negli-
gence. 2 In these cases, the goal is deterrence or vindication rather than
compensation. 3 Thus, in the typical personal injury action, the law attempts
to equate the damage award with the amount of the damages suffered. 4
To assist the jury in determining the amount of damages to be awarded
common law courts began to suggest possible compensable elements of dam-
age. Such elements have now been incorporated into the pattern jury in-
structions employed in various jurisdictions. While such pattern jury instruc-
tions usually announce the principle of "compensation,"' 5 an examination of
* Professor of Law, University of Illinois; B.S.E., University of Pennsylvania; J.D., Co-
lumbia University.
1. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES, §§ 20, 137 (1935) [hereinafter
cited as MCCORMICK]; James, Damages in Accident Cases, 41 CORNELL L.Q. 582, 583 (1956)
[hereinafter cited as James]. See generally D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES
(1973) [hereinafter cited as DOBBs]; A. SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES
(9th ed. 1912); J.C. SUTHERLAND, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES (4th ed. 1916) [here-
inafter cited as SUTHERLAND]. This Article deals only with personal injury actions in which the
victim survives until a verdict is returned. In many states, if the victim dies before the verdict,
wrongful death statutes create a new cause of action in the name of the victim's survivors. See,
e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, §§ 1, 2 (1975).
2. James, supra note 1, at 582.
3. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, at §§ 77-85.
4. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 903, comment a (1939); James, supra note 1, at 583.
5. See,, e.g., D. WRIGHT, 1 CONNECTICUT JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL § 226 (1970); Mis-
SOURI APPROVED JURY INSTRUCTION § 4.01 (1969).
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these instructions reveals that there is a serious possibility of both over and
under compensation. This is particularly true with respect to non-pecuniary
damages.
This Article will explore those elements of damage frequently employed in
pattern jury instructions with a view toward exposing those elements which
potentially lead to improper compensation of the personal injury plaintiff.
Also, the importance of understanding the difference between an injury it-
self, guidelines in measuring an injury, and an element of damage arising
from an injury is explained. Finally, a proposed pattern jury instruction is
delineated.6
THE APPROACH OF PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
When faced with the task of instructing a jury to make the plaintiff as
nearly whole as may be achieved by an award of money, a court could in-
struct the jury to compensate the plaintiff for his entire injury. Under such
circumstances, the jury is simply being instructed in general terms to return
the sum of money which would fairly and reasonably compensate the plain-
tiff for the injuries resulting from the defendant's negligent or culpable con-
duct. Such an instruction in effect says to the jury, here is the plaintiff with
only one arm; compensate him or her for the loss of that arm.
Alternatively, the court could instruct the jury more specifically as to the
consequences of the injury inflicted upon the plaintiff to the extent sup-
ported by the evidence. In pattern jury instructions the consequences of the
injury to the plaintiff are referred to as elements of damage. The aggregate
of all such elements of damage, each separately compensable by the jury, is
equivalent to compensating the plaintiff for the entire injury. Since the ele-
ments of damage (the consequences of the injury) comprise the effect of the
injury on the life of the plaintiff, the total award received constitutes com-
pensation designed to make the plaintiff as whole a person as can be ac-
complished through an award of money.
The alternative of instructing the jury in general terms to compensate the
plaintiff for injuries sustained was adopted in Power v. City of Augusta.7 In
Power, rather than itemizing all of the possible effects of a permanent injury,
the court concluded that the jury was best left on its own to decide what
elements of damage the injury had produced. The court reasoned that if the
instructions itemized the possible damages that could arise from the injury,
it could have a "harrowing" and "baneful" effect upon the jury.8 Like the
6. The scope of this Article is limited to developing a pattern set of jury instructions aimed
at compensating the personal injury plaintiff for those damages which may be recoverable pur-
suant to the applicable substantive law. Accordingly, analysis of various questions of substantive
law will not be undertaken.
7. 191 F. 647 (E.D. Ken. 1911).
8. Id. at 655. The court explained:
The jury should be allowed to take into consideration the effect of the permanent
injury otherwise than on the power to earn or make money. And it seems to me
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instruction in Power, the Missouri jury instructions do not itemize the ele-
ments of personal injury damage. In Missouri, the court instructs the jury to
compensate the plaintiff for any damages they believe the plaintiff has suf-
fered, without suggesting to the jury what elements could comprise those
damages. 9 In justification of the instruction, the Committee Comment
states that the rule is easily understood and that, because no items of dam-
ages are set, there is no risk that the jury will be instructed on items of
damage not supported by the record. 10
However, if the court in its instructions fails to itemize the elements of
damage arising from the injury, the jury might not realize what compensable
elements of damage the plaintiff suffered. Thus, the plaintiff would be un-
dercompensated if he suffered an element of damage that the jury did not
perceive. This danger is obviated by instructing the jury as to those ele-
ments of damage that are supported by the evidence."
An instruction in general terms to compensate the plaintiff for the injury
received creates a risk of overcompensation as well as one of undercompen-
sation. A jury given no criteria might award damages for a consequence of an
injury when insufficient evidence was introduced to support such an award.
Similarly, the court's failure to itemize the instructions makes it more dif-
ficult for opposing counsel and the court to confine argument by counsel for
the injured party on the question of damages to those elements supported
by the evidence. For these reasons, it is not surprising that an examination
of the jury instructions in thirty states 12 reveals that in all those states ex-
cept Missouri, the courts attempt to guide the jury's assessment of personal
injury damages by itemizing the elements of damage.
that, where the effect of the permanent injury is not limited to such power, it
should be left to the jury generally as I did in this case, instead of itemizing all the
possible effects. To do so would be excessive itemization. The withholding of its
harrowing effect is more to be desired than giving the jury a more definite
guide .... Coming from the Court, it is possible for it to be quite baneful.
Id.
9. Missouri Supreme Court Committee on Jury Instructions, MISSOURI APPROVED JURY
INSTRUCTIONS, § 4.01 (1969):
If you find the issues in favor of the plaintiff, then you must award the plaintiff such
sum as you believe will fairly and justly compensate the plaintiff for any damages
you believe he sustained [and is reasonably certain to sustain in the future] as a
direct result of the occurrence mentioned in the evidence.
10. Committee Comment, MISSOURI APPROVED JURY INSTRUCTIONS, § 4.01 (1969). The
comment also points out, however, that the elements of damage are suggested to the jury
during the arguments of the attorneys. Id.
11. In Lexington By. v. Herring, 30 Ky. 269, petition for rehearing denied 97 S.W. 1127
(1906), the trial court instructed the jury to compensate the plaintiff for "such further sum as
will fairly compensate her for the loss of her foot." In rejecting this instruction, the appellate
court stated that it "would ... in effect . . . give the jury no criterion of damages, and is
equivalent to an instruction to them to find for the plaintiff such a sum as they deemed right,
considering the injury she had received." Id.
12. See Appendix infra for a complete listing of the thirty states.
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Although approved jury instructions itemize the elements of damage re-
sulting from the injury, the list of elements differs by jurisdiction.13 Some
elements appear in every jurisdiction that itemizes damages. For example,
all thirty of the jurisdictions studied compensate plaintiffs for lost earnings, 14
medical expense, 15 and pain. 16 The instructions differ in substance princi-
pally on the itemization of the non-pain and non-pecuniary elements of dam-
age. In many jurisdictions, disfigurement, 17 disability,' 8 and the nature, ex-
tent, and duration 19 of the injury are recognized as elements of damage.
Moreover, at least one of the jurisdictions under consideration employs each
of the following terms: embarrassment, suffering, mental suffering, physical
suffering, emotional distress, impairment of facilities, effect upon normal use
of facilities, pursuit of normal life, humiliation, physical pain, mental an-
guish, fright, shock, mortification, denial of social pleasures and enjoyments,
health, inconvenience, discomfort, fear, apprehension, anxiety and aggrava-
tion of pre-existing ailment or condition.20 Thus, jury instructions currently
employed vary in their methods of denominating compensable elements of
personal injury damages. As a result, there is an obvious risk that a com-
pensable item of damage might fall outside those elements included in the
jury instructions of a particular jurisdiction.
Likewise, in the instructions currently used, one element of damage fre-
quently may overlap another element. Since courts instruct juries to com-
pensate the plaintiff for each element of damage supportable by the evi-
dence,21 a danger of overcompensation exists in many jurisdictions. This
13. The South Dakota Instructions, which are based on the Illinois Pattern Jury Instruc-
tions, provide an unusual instance of relative congruity of elements.
14. See text and accompanying notes 26-37 infra.
15. See text and accompanying notes 38-43 infra.
16. See text and accompanying notes 52-54 infra.
17. See, e.g., ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL § 22.08 (2d ed. 1974); FLORIDA
STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 6.2(a) (Hein 1967); ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS-
CIVIL § 30.04 (B. Smith 1961 and Supp. 1965); INDIANA PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 9.01(g)
(Bobbs-Merrill 1966); MICHIGAN STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL § 30.03 (Hall 1970);
MINNESOTA JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES-CIVIL § 155 (1963); SOUTH DAKOTA JURY INSTRUC-
TIONS § 30.04 (1971); 2 VIRGINIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 23.01 (Doubles, Emroch & Merhige
1964); 2 INSTRUCTIONS FOR VIRGINIA AND WEST VIRGINIA §§ 39-114 (Abbott and Solomon ed.
1962); WASHINGTON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL § 30.04 (1967).
18. See, e.g., ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL, supra note 17, at § 30.04;
IOWA PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 3.9; MICHIGAN STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL,
supra note 17, at § 30.03; MINNESOTA JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES-CIVIL, supra note 17, at §
155; SOUTH DAKOTA JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 30.04 (1971); 2 INSTRUCTIONS FOR VIRGINIA AND
WEST VIRGINIA, supra note 17, at §§ 39-114; WISCONSIN JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL- Part II
§ 30.04 (1967).
19. See, e.g., ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL, supra note 17, at 22.02; IL-
LINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL, supra note 17, at § 30.02; INDIANA PATTERN JURY
INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 17, at § 59.01(a); NEW MEXICO UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL
§ 14.3 (1966); WASHINGTON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL, supra note 17, at § 30.02.
20. See generally Appendix infra.
21. See, e.g., ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 17, at § 30.01; INDIANA
PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 17, at § 9.01; MICHIGAN STANDARD JURY INSTRUC-
TIONS, supra note 17, at § 30.00.
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danger is accentuated where a "blackboard" argument, approved in cases
such as Caley v. Manicke,22 is employed. In Caley, the trial court permitted
plaintiff's counsel to show the jury a chart that listed the compensable ele-
ments of damage and to assign a suggested dollar recovery to each ele-
ment. 23  The appellate court rejected defendant's argument that the use of
the chart was improper because it might be construed as evidence, stating
that the plaintiff's chart was simply a tool used in argument and that the
chart was not admitted into evidence. 24  According to the appellate court,
problems in addition "almost by definition are better delineated on paper.
To be meaningful, they should be seen and heard, not just heard." 25  A
jury presented with a "blackboard" argument is more likely to compensate
the plaintiff separately for each element of damage. This increases the
danger of overcompensation where there is an overlap of either the elements
of damage or the arguments of counsel concerning the elements of damage.
COMPENSABLE ELEMENTS OF DAMAGE
Pecuniary Elements of Damage
A. Lost Earnings
In general, plaintiffs are entitled to compensation for earnings lost prior to
the jury's verdict as well as the present value of earnings reasonably certain
22. 29 II1. App. 2d 323, 173 N.E.2d 209 (1961), rev'd on other grounds, 24 Ill. 2d 390, 182
N.E.2d 206 (1962).
23. At 29 I11. App. 2d at 333, 173 N.E.2d at 214, the chart appears exactly as follows:
1. Nature and Extent $50,140.90 $10,000.00
2. Pain and Suffering
April 16, 1956
11, 680 hours 11,680.10
510 days 5,100.00
3. Future Pain 8,760.00
4. Hospital and Medical
$873.00 + $415.90 1,288.90




24. Id. at 340, 173 N.E.2d at 217. The court noted further that the chart does not go to the
jury room. Id.
25. Id. On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court approved the portion of the appellate court's
opinion concerning the use of the chart. Caley v. Manicke, 24 II1. 2d 390, 182 N.E.2d 206
(1962). The supreme court, however, held that the mathematical argument concerning damages
for pain and suffering was improper. Id. at 392, 182 N.E.2d at 208. See also text and accom-
panying notes 90-95 infra.
19781
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
to be lost in the future. 26 If the plaintiff is not working at the time of the
injury, the defendant must still compensate the plaintiff for the fair market
value of his time, even if the plaintiff would never have earned any
wages. 27  Similarly, a housewife is entitled to recover for the market value
of lost earning capacity whether or not she planned to enter the workforce.
2 8
Personal injury plaintiffs are not always forced to accept an estimate of the
market value of their time as the measure of their damages for lost earning
capacity.2 9 If the plaintiff actually was employed at the time of the injury,
he or she may recover for wages actually lost, rather than for the market
value of the time.30  In such a situation, actual wage loss constitutes evi-
dence of lost earning capacity. 31
Specific lost opportunities also may be shown as evidence of lost earning
capacity.3 2  If the plaintiff has suffered only partial incapacity, the defendant
need not compensate the plaintiff for any amount that the plaintiff earns or
reasonably could earn. 33 Under the collateral source rule, however, the
defendant must compensate the plaintiff for lost earning capacity whether or
not the plaintiff receives compensation for lost earnings from another
source. 34
If an injury shortens the plaintiff's life expectancy, most American courts
compute future earnings loss on the basis of the life expectancy the plaintiff
26. See ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 17, at § 30.07; INDIANA PAT-
TERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 17, at § 9.01(d); VIRGINIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS 23.01
(Doubles, Emroch & Merhige 1964); James, supra note 1, at 598.
27. DOBBS, supra note 1, at § 8.0. See also McLaughlin v. Chicago M. & S.P. & P. Ry., 31
Wis. 2d 378, 143 N.W.2d 32 (1966). In McLaughlin the plaintiff was a priest who had taken a
vow of poverty and thus would never earn a salary. Nevertheless, because the plaintiff's injury
reduced his earning capacity, he was entitled to compensation from the negligent defendant. Id.
at 393-95, 143 N.W.2d at 39-40.
28. See Davis v. Renton, 113 Cal. App. 561, 298 P. 834 (1931); James, supra note 1, at 600.
29. DOBBS, supra note 1, at 541.
30. See Kinchen v. Cottle, 173 So. 2d 379 (La. Ct. of App. 1965).
31. See Greyhound Lines Inc. v. Craig, 430 S.W.2d 573 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
32. In Gooch v. Lake, 327 S.W.2d 132 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1959), for example, a student's injury
prevented him from playing football during his senior year of school. The court permitted the
student to show that his inability to play football affected his starting salary as a football coach
the following year. Also, in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reese, 425 P.2d 465 (Okl. Sup. Ct.
1967), the court permitted evidence that the injury prevented the plaintiff from completing a
course that would have increased her earnings. See also DOBBS, supra note 1, at 541.
33. See James, supra note 1, at 598; MCCORMICK, supra note 1, at §§ 86, 87.
34. For example, the plaintiff may not suffer any wage loss if his employer does not discon-
tinue his salary or the plaintiff receives disability benefits. Note that the New York Jury Instruc-
tions eliminate the collateral source rule. COMMITTEE ON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, 1
NEW YORK PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL § 2:300 (1965):
If, in determining the amount of damage sustained by the plaintiff, you determine
that the plaintiff did not actually suffer loss of his entire (wages, salary) but did in
fact receive part of his (wages, salary) from ([state source, e.g.,] his employer), you




would have had if the injury had not been suffered. 35 One commentator
suggested that this rule overcompensates plaintiffs because no deduction is
made for living expenses that the plaintiff would have incurred between the
time of death and the time he would have died if he had not been in-
jured. 36  Still, the contrary rule leads to undercompensation because the
plaintiffs dependents will suffer a loss of support during the plaintiff's "lost
years." 
3 7
B. Medical and Other Expenses
The plaintiff can recover the reasonable cost of all medical and hospital
expenses incurred as a result of the injury.3" Recovery is permitted both for
expenses incurred prior to the jury's verdict, 39 and for the present value of
the expenses reasonably certain to be incurred in the future.4 0  As in the
case of lost earnings, the "collateral source" rule may entitle the plaintiff to
compensation for medical expenses, even if those expenses have been reim-
bursed by a medical or accident insurance plan.41 In addition to the recov-
ery for medical expenses, the personal injury plaintiff may be entitled to
recover for other expenses that are reasonably related to the injury. The
35. See Prairie Creek Coal Co. v. Kittrel, 106 Ark. 138, 153 S.W. 89 (1912); West v. Boston
& M.R.R., 81 N.H. 522, 129 A. 768 (1925); James, supra note 1, at 599 n.109; McCoRMICK,
supra note 1, at § 86 n.20, 21. See also Crecelius v. Gamble Skogmo, Inc., 144 Neb. 394, 395,
13 N.W.2d 627, 629 (1944), wherein it was noted:
In an action for damages for personal injuries which are permanent and have im-
paired the earning capacity, damages for pecuniary loss by reason of decreased earn-
ing power are to be based on life expectancy immediately before the injury and for
future mental and physical suffering on probable expectancy of life in plaintiff's
injured condition.
36. James, supra note 1, at 599 n. 109.
37. Id. See also Fleming, The Lost Years: A Problem in the Computation and Distribution
of Damages, 50 CAL. L. REV. 598 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Fleming], who suggested that
awarding recovery for lost earning capacity during the "lost years" produces a windfall to the
victim at the expense of the rights of his dependents. Id. at 608. Fleming also asserted that
courts should reconsider the traditional rule in light of the continuing advances in diagnostic
and clinical skills. Id. at 598. Fleming concluded that the dependent's interest in support should
not be extinguished by the victim's prior recovery for lost earning capacity during the "lost
years." Id. at 605.
The rule concerning lost wages differs from the rule concerning non-pecuniary losses where
the plaintiffs are not permitted to recover for their "lost years." See text and accompanying
notes 82-89 infra. Also, the payment for future pecuniary loss is discounted to present value.
See, e.g., ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 17, at §§ 30.07, 34.02; James,
supra note 1, at 599.
38. See INDIANA PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 17, at § 30.07, 34.02; James,
supra note 1, at 599; MINNESOTA JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES, supra note 17, at § 159.
39. Rigley v. Prior, 290 Mo. 10, 233 S.W. 828 (1921); James, supra note 1, at 602.
40. Weadock v. Eagle Indem. Co., 15 So. 2d 132 (La. Ct. of App. 1943); James, supra note
1, at 602.
41. Id. Hudson v. Lazarus, 217 F.2d 344 (D.C. Cir. 1954); Plank v. Summers, 203 Md.
522, 102 A.2d 262 (1954).
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plaintiff, for example, may be able to recover the cost of hiring a house-
keeper in the home 4 2 or the expense of a trip that is necessary to' safeguard
health. 4
3
Non-Pecuniary Elements of Damage
The problem of over and undercompensation is most acute with respect to
jury instructions relating to non-pecuniary elements of damage. Overcom-
pensation is fostered by two factors: a lack of mutually exclusive denomina-
tions of compensable elements; and the inclusion of items as consequential
elements of damage which actually represent statements of the injuries
themselves or guidelines in measuring an injury. Undercompensation may
occur when an element of damage that is properly compensable is either not
charged at all or charged in an ambiguous manner. The current Illinois pat-
tern jury instructions relating to non-pecuniary damages exemplify the sig-
nificant dangers of both under and overcompensation.
Combining only those elements relating to non-pecuniary damages, the
Illinois jury would receive the following instruction: 44
If you decide for the plaintiff on the question of liability, you must then
fix the amount of money which will reasonably and fairly compensate him
for any of the following elements of damage proved by the evidence to
have resulted from the negligence [wrongful conduct] of the defendant: 45
(1) The pain and suffering experienced [and reasonably certain to be
experienced in the future] as a result of the injuries.46
(2) The [disability] [and] [disfigurement] resulting from the injury.4 7
(3) The nature, extent and duration of the injury.48
(4) The aggravation of any pre-existing ailment or condition.49
Whether any of these elements of damages has been proved by the
evidence is for you to determine.5
0
A. Pain and Suffering
The elements of pain and suffering employed in the instant jury instruc-
tion incorporate many distinct concepts. These concepts, consisting of pain,
42. See Astles v. Quaker City Bus Co., 158 F.2d 979 (2d Cir. 1947); ILLINOIS PATTERN
JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 17, at § 30.09.
43. See Woodman v. Peck, 90 N.H. 292, 7 A.2d 251 (1939); James, supra note 1, at 603. Of
course the plaintiff must show that such expenses are sufficiently related to the injury suffered.
44. A particular element would be instructed only if there was sufficient evidence in support
of that element.
45. ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 17, at § 30.01. The four elemeots
listed at notes 46-49 infra are not in the proper sequence in order to facilitate subsequent
discussion.
46. Id. at § 30.05.
47. Id. at § 30.04.
48. Id. at § 30.02.
49. Id. at § 30.03.
50. Id. at § 30.01.
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physical suffering, inconvenience, mental suffering, and humiliation and em-
barrassment, are treated as separate elements of damage in many of the
other pattern jury instructions reviewed. 51  Each of these concepts will be
examined in turn.
In its broadest sense, pain has been defined as a hurt experienced in the
body because of an injury.52 McCormick characterized this sensation more
precisely as the "immediate felt effect upon the nerves and brain of some
lesion or injury to a part of the body." 5 3  Obviously, for pain as well as
suffering to be compensable, the plaintiff must experience the effect; he or
she must be conscious when the unpleasant experience occurs. 54
The plaintiff also may endure physical suffering, 55 as distinct from pain, as
a result of the defendant's negligence. Physical suffering may immediately
accompany the injury, or it may be an incident of medical treatment, 56 such
51. See note 17 supra.
52. J. STEIN, DAMAGES AND RECOVERY-PERSONAL INJURY AND DEATH ACTIONS § 9 (1972);
[hereinafter cited as STEIN]; O'Quinn, Common Elements of Recovery in Personal Injury Cases,
18 S. TEX. L.J. 179, 182 (1977) [hereinafter cited as O'Quinn]. Dr. Yale Koskoff concluded that
pain "is a sensation or a sensory experience like touch, but more varied and complex." Koskoff,
The Nature of Pain and Suffering, 13 TRIAL (July 1977) No. 7 at 22 [hereinafter cited as Kos-
koff]. Dr. Koskoff continued:
Like touch the impulses are conducted by pathways in the spinal cord to the
thalamus-head station for sensory pathways. Both touch and pain project nerve
fibers to the cerebral cortex. Pain appears to reach consciousness at the thalamic
level-where it is experienced as "what hurts." Touch is perceived and analyzed at
the cortical level. For touch, the model of the telephone wire bringing messages to
the brain is appropriate.. For pain, the telephone line is inadequate. The private
line model does not explain the variations in pain perception among individuals, nor
in a given individual during varying conditions. It does not take into account
chronic pain states, the effect of emotional disturbance, the relief afforded by pro-
cedures which do not follow known anatomical lines carrying pain messages-
acupuncture, for example.
There is a new model to guide us toward a better understanding of the pain
experience .... It proposes a mechanism whereby impulses bearing pain are mod-
ulated before they gain access to the brain. The modulation is accomplished by the
fibers carrying touch messages. These fibers which are larger than the pain fibers
exert the modulating influence within the gray matter of the spinal cord. As a result
the amount of impulses bearing pain messages are determined not only by the
extent and duration of stimulation of pain fibers but by the activity of the touch
fibers. Touch fibers act as a "gate control system." When they are active, the "gate"
is more difficult to open. If "open," it may be "closed" by activity of the fibers
bearing touch messages. The brain sends impulses to affect the action of the gate.
Anxiety opens the gate. Pleasurable stimulation closes it.
Id. at 22-23.
53. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, at § 88.
54. Plant, Damages for Pain and Suffering, 19 OHIO ST. L.J. 200 (1958) [hereinafter cited
as Plant]. See Ratushny v. Punch, 106 Conn. 329, 138 A. 220 (1927).
55. See generally STEIN, supra note 52, at §§ 9, 10; Olender, Proof and Evaluation of Pain
and Suffering in Personal Injury Litigation, 1962 DUKE L.J. 344; Plant, supra note 54, at 200.
56. See, e.g., Di Leo v. Dolensky, 129 Conn. 203, 27 A.2d 126 (1942); Pretzer v. California
Transit Co., 211 Cal. 202, 294 P. 382 (1930).
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as that arising from being placed in traction, 57 a surgical operation for skin
graft, 5 8 or the Pasteur treatment for rabies. 59  Physical suffering also may
occur during the rehabilitation stage, for example, as accompanying physical
therapy. The foregoing is only illustrative, for the variety of physical suffer-
ing that a person may be required to endure is almost endless. So long as
plaintiff sustains physical agony or severe discomfort, plaintiff has suffered
physically. Thus, everything from the agony suffered by the burn victim,6 0
to bed sores, to the aches of a person forced to use crutches may comprise
compensable physical suffering. 61
Aside from the compensation for the pain and physical suffering that an
injury causes, plaintiffs also should be permitted to collect for the inconveni-
ence resulting from the injury.62  For example, in Braddock v. Seaboard
Airline .R., 63 an eight year old boy was returning home from school
when he was run over by a locomotive. He suffered the loss of his left leg.
The court permitted the plaintiff to recover for the annoyance and incon-
venience involved in bi-weekly visits to a physician that would be necessary
to adjust the plaintiff's prosthetic equipment over his fifty-six year life expec-
tancy. Obviously, this was an inconvenience in the plaintiff's life which was
not present prior to the injury. To the extent established by the evidence,
the plaintiff in Braddock should also be able to recover for the inconveni-
ence involved in all aspects of the use of the equipment, including putting it
on, removing it, and maintenance. In short, the injured plaintiff should be
compensated for inconvenience to the degree that he is required to spend
more time, exert more energy, or pay more attention in conducting an activ-
ity as the result of his injury. 64 Lack of a specific pattern jury instruction
relating to inconvenience could lead to undercompensation.
The concept of mental suffering as an element of damage is neither easily
defined nor described. Mental suffering includes immediate emotional re-
sponses to perceived events, such as fear or worry, as well as those less
immediate feelings associated with the concepts of anxiety and depression.
Dr. Yale Koskoff concluded that suffering "embraces those distressful experi-
57. See Smith v. Wichita Transp. Corp., 179 Kan. 8, 293 P.2d 242 (1956).
58. See Lane v. Southern Ry., 192 N.C. 287, 134 S.E. 855 (1926).
59. See Serio v. American Brewing Co., 141 La. 290, 74 So. 998 (1917).
60. Sandifer Oil Co. v. Dew, 220 Miss. 609, 71 So. 2d 752 (1954).
61. See, e.g., Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. McAlister, 256 S.W.2d 654 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953)
(difficulty in swallowing); Orme v. Watkins, 44 Wash.2d 325, 267 P.2d 681 (1954) (knee
bothered plaintiff).
62. See Kennon v. Gilmer, 131 U.S. 22 (1889); International Great N. R.R. v. King,
41 S.W.2d 234 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1931); INSTRUCTIONS FOR FLORIDA § 417; 2 VIRGINIA JURY
INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 17, at § 2301.
63. 80 So. 2d 662 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1955).
64. For example, consider the situation where the plaintiff wets his bed, takes two hours to
eat a meal, or can only sit five minutes at a time.
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ences which go beyond pain." 65 He also noted that anxiety and depression
are at the core of mental suffering. 66
Anxiety, the feeling of uneasiness and distress often derived from the an-
ticipation of danger, is augmented by a feeling of helplessness. 67 Anxiety
may cause physical symptoms such as awkwardness in movement, nausea, or
pain. Also, it is the cause of serious behavioral disturbances and the basis of
personality changes associated with chronic somatic disorders. Depression,
65. Koskoff, supra note 52, at 25. See also Koskoff, Proving Suffering, 14 TRIAL (July 1978)
No. 7 at 46.
66. Koskoff, supra note 52, at 23. Dr. Koskoff summarized the difference between pain (a
sensation) and mental suffering (a mood) as follows:
1. Pain as a result of impact is experienced by all (for the most part) to the same
degree under given circumstances depending on the nature and extent of bodily
injury.
2. Pain experience does not vary significantly with the vulnerability of an indi-
vidual in his life situation-nor with his adaptive capacities.
3. Suffering takes time to develop, except for the brief periods following unsus-
tained painful trauma-and then suffering is minimal.
4. Suffering depends on the "memory" capacity of the nervous system.
5. Suffering is experienced to a different degree in different people following
similar traumatic situations.
6. Suffering depends to a greater degree and with greater frequency on the cir-
cumstances of the trauma which may be without physical impact.
7. Suffering will vary in accordance with the patients' vulnerability in his life
situation and his adaptive capacities. In this light suffering may be considered an
exacerbation of pre-existing anxiety/depression to the degree that it interferes with
the person's life-in-action.
8. Prolonged suffering will produce pain symptoms as one of the adverse effects
of body function. Such maladaptive disturbances will augment suffering.
Thus a vicious cycle is established wherein pain produces suffering and suffering
produces pain.
Id. at 24.
67. Koskoff, supra note 52, at 23. Dr. Koskoff stated the following:
Physical manifestations of anxiety-its behavioral patterns-are well known. There
is increased muscle tension, tremor, increased tendon reflexes, awkwardness in
movement, facial tics, tightening of the throat, unsteadiness. Cardiovascular man-
ifestations of anxiety include precordial pain, tachycardia, overbreathing, nausea,
cramps, and diarrhea.
The behavioral patterns of anxiety may be categorized in accordance with the de-
gree of distress: (1) alertness, akin to vigilance in animals; (2) apprehension resulting
from anticipation of a stressful experience with many of the symptoms described
above; (3) "face" anxiety previously noted; and (4) panic, catastrophic anxiety attacks
characterized by unrealistic behavior, fatigue states with Impaired consciousness,




the mood most consistently associated with anxiety, is characterized by
apathy, a sense of futility and loss of self worth.
68
In addition to the mood of anxiety or depression, mental suffering also
includes the more temporal emotional reactions of fear, worry, fright, and
shock. Finally, plaintiff's awareness of the elements of damage is also com-
pensible as part of mental suffering. A plaintiff, for example, aware that he
will experience future pain and loss of earnings because of an injury, might
suffer mentally. In arguing for the recovery of damages for mental suffering,
the plaintiff's attorney may not only point out the plaintiff's fright at the
time of the injury69 and extreme anxiety and depression, 70 but also fear of
the consequences of the injury. 71
As is readily apparent, the concept of mental suffering as an element of
damage is closely intertwined with the concept of mental condition as an
injury. Sometimes the distinction between the two is not readily apparent.
Fortunately, the determinative factor for purposes of analysis is a practical
one: does the mental condition under discussion give rise to any element of
damage other than mental suffering? If it does, the mental condition must be
described as an injury; if it does not, it may be treated solely as the element
of damage referred to as mental suffering.
68. Dr. Koskoff described the manifestations of suffering:
Suffering in the child is manifested as nightmares, eneuresis, interference with
appetite, regressive behavior in relation to parents and siblings, and poor school
performance.
Suffering in the adolescent is manifested as increased volatile and rebellious be-
havior and increased concern with life and death and his own identity. Following
trauma, hostility and guilt are prominent.
Suffering in the adult is also manifested by increased concern for maintenance of
economic independence and for the ability to continue adequate job performance.
Sexual dysfunction is almost invariable. This may be impotence or hypersexuality,
frigidity or nymphomania. Somatic symptoms described previously are prominent.
Interference with work, play, and social activity are characteristic.
id.
69. See Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Nelson, 212 F. 69 (8th Cir. 1914); Easton v. United Trade
School Contracting Co., 173 Cal. 199, 159 P. 597 (1916); Plant, supra note 54, at 200.
70. See Redick v. Peterson, 99 Wash. 368, 169 P. 804 (1918); Plant, supra note 54, at 200.
71. See Halloran v. New England T. & T. Co., 95 Vt. 273, 115 A.143 (1921); James, supra
note 1, at 604.
In Figlar v. Gordon, 133 Conn. 577, 53 A. 645 (1947), for example, the plaintiff was permit-
ted to recover for her fear of developing epilepsy from a brain injury, even though the evidence
was insufficient to prove that epilepsy would in fact develop.
Also, in Watson v. Augusta Brewing Co., 124 Ga. 121, 52 S.E. 152 (1905), the defendant
injured the plaintiff when bits of glass were negligently included in a soft drink that the plaintiff
consumed. The court stated that in swallowing several bits of glass, the plaintiff reasonably
could entertain "a very vivid and poignant apprehension of an untimely end; and the mental
anguish caused by this dread may constitute an element of damage in a suit for damages on
account of the physical injury." Id. at 125, 52 S.E. at 153.
The plaintiff may attempt to recover damages both for injuries that already exist and for
injuries that will develop in the future. See Lambert, Rheingold & Joost, Comments on Recent
Important Personal Injury (Tort) Cases, 29 NACCA L.J. 46, 198 (1963) [hereinafter cited as
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To illustrate, if the plaintiff is frightened by the sight of an oncoming car,
the plaintiff's temporary fright is solely an element of damage-assuming it
does not also give rise to another element of damage. If, however, as a
result of the ensuing accident, the plaintiff becomes so apprehensive as to
experience pain and is emotionally unable to ride again in an automobile,
plaintiff's mental condition is best described as an injury giving rise to vari-
ous elements of damage, one of which is mental suffering. Recognition of the
foregoing distinction takes on practical importance in connection with the
process of assuring that plaintiff's counsel does not request compensation
twice for the same consequential damage.
Humiliation and embarrassment are two other aspects of mental suffering
sometimes referred to separately in jury instructions regarding non-
pecuniary damages. The presence of a separate instruction derives from the
fact that humiliation and embarrassment are aspects of mental suffering usu-
ally associated solely with disfigurement. Occasionally, humiliation and em-
barrassment arising from a plaintiff's disfigurement has been held not to be a
compensable element of damage in a personal injury action. 72 The rationale
for this minority rule was stated by the court in Southern Pac. Co. v.
Hetzer.73  In Hetzer, the plaintiff's leg had been amputated above the knee
due to the defendant railroad's negligence. According to the court, the
humiliation that the person felt because of his disfigurement was too remote
and indefinite to constitute an element of damages. Furthermore, evidence
of humiliation was incapable of being tested at trial because the evidence
rested "entirely in the belief of the sufferer." 74  Thus, the court held that
the plaintiff could not recover for humiliation or embarrassment.
Lambert]. The NACCA Law Journal is a publication of the National Association of Claimant's
Counsel of America.
The plaintiff can recover the elements of damage that a future injury will produce if he can
meet his burden of proof that the future injury and consequent damages are reasonably certain
to occur. See Kiker v. Davis, 103 Ga. App. 289, 118 S.E.2d 861 (1961) (plaintiff's lip would
become depressed if damaged teeth were replaced with artificial ones); Schwarting v. Orgam,
123 Neb.76, 242 N.W. 273 (1932) (epilepsy and insanity could develop); Lorenc v. Chemical
Corp., 37 N.J. 56, 179 A.2d 401 (1962) (plaintiff required to accept an operation only if a
reasonable prospect of restoration and relief from disability would result).
72. See, e.g., Southern P. Co. v. Hetzer, 135 F. 272 (8th Cir. 1905); Diamond Rubber Co.
v. Harryman, 41 Colo. 415, 92 P. 922 (1907); Indianapolis & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Stables, 62
Il. 313, 321 (1872).
73. 135 F. 272 (8th Cir. 1905).
74. Id. at 274. The court further articulated the following:
But mortification or distress of mind from the contemplation of the crippled condi-
tion and of its effect upon the esteem of his fellows, that mental pain which is
separable from the physical suffering caused by the injury, is too remote, indefinite,
and intangible to constitute an element of the damages in such a case and evidence
of it is inadmissible. . . . Mental pain of this character, the suffering from injured
feelings, is intangible, incapable of test or trial. The evidence of it, like that which
converted the alleged witches, rests entirely in the belief of the sufferer, and it is
not susceptible of contradiction or rebuttal. Many other causes, the education,
temperament, and sentiment of the sufferer, the mental attitude, the acts and
1978]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
Most courts, however, have rejected the Hetzer rationale. 75 Mental suf-
fering which is reasonably certain to be endured in the future may be consi-
dered in assessing a personal injury plaintiff's damages. There is no more
reason to ignore humiliation than there is to ignore other forms of mental
suffering.76 The cause of humiliation is neither uncertain nor more difficult
to prove than any other form of mental suffering. Adopting this rationale,
most courts correctly permit plaintiffs to recover for the humiliation and em-
barrassment caused by an injury. 77
The comments to the various pattern jury instructions under review do
not attempt to distinguish between the concepts of embarrassment and
humiliation. The Restatement of Torts defines humiliation as "a feeling of
degradation or inferiority or a feeling that other people will regard one with
aversion or dislike." 78  This author suggests the following distinction: em-
barrassment refers to the individual's own perception of himself, that is, feel-
ings of degradation or inferiority; while humiliation refers to the individual's
feelings in reaction to how he perceives others will regard him. In other
words, embarrassment is a solitary state of mental suffering, while humilia-
tion is a reaction to how the individual perceives others actually responding
to him. While this distinction may be helpful for purposes of guiding argu-
ments of counsel, it seems preferable to follow the lead of the Restatement
words of his friends and acquintances, concur with the accident to cause this mental
distress in such a way that it is impossible to separate and ascribe the proper part of
it to the injury caused by the defendant. And the amount of mental pain caused by
any disfigurement necessarily varies so with the character, temperament, and cir-
cumstances of the injured person that no just measure of damages from it can be
found. Such mental suffering is too remote, intangible, and unmeasureable to form
the basis of any just adjudication. . . . Id.
75. Erie R.R. Co. v. Collins, 253 U.S. 77 (1920); Cunningham v. Pennsylvania R.R., 55 F.
Supp. 1012 (E.D.N.Y. 1944); Patterson v. Blatti, 133 Minn. 23, 157 N.W. 717 (1916); James,
supra note 1, at 604; Plant, supra note 54, at 201.
If the plaintiff has suffered a scar, instead of going out in public and thereby experiencing
humiliation, the plaintiff may decide to stay at home. In such a case, the plaintiff also should
recover not only for embarassment but also for loss of a normal life. The same is true to the
extent that the plaintiff emotionally can no longer engage in non-economic activities. Of course,
the plaintiff must satisfy his burden of proof that the scar caused these damages.
76. Patterson v. Blatti, 133 Minn. 23, 27, 157 N.W. 717, 718 (1916).
77. Anderson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 377 F. Supp. 136 (E.D. La. 1974) (portion of mill-
ion dollar verdict allowed for "humiliation and embarrassment" stemming from gross disfigure-
ment); Dyer v. Payne, 246 Ark. 92, 436 S.W. 2d 818 (1969) (mortifying and embarrassing speech
difficulties caused by accident are compensable); Carminati v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 405 Pa.
500, 176 A.2d 440 (1964) (ten year old girl awarded $79,500 for future humiliation and embar-
rassment after street car accident permanently doubled her vision); Texas Farm Products Co. v.
Leva, 535 S.W. 2d 953 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976) (fork truck operator's hand crushed; $20,000
cosmetic impairment award based on "embarrassment to shake hands") See also STEIN, supra
note 52, at 45.
78. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 905(d) (Tent. Draft No. 19, 1973). To "humiliate" means "to
reduce to a lower position in one's own eyes, or in the eyes of others; to injure the self-respect
of." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1101 (3rd ed. unabridged 1961). To
embarrass means to "disconcert.'" Id. at 739.
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and instruct the jury by including both concepts as part of that element of
damage simply denominated as "humiliation."
Personal injury plaintiffs can recover for the "pain and suffering" elements
of damage that are reasonably certain to occur in the future as well as those
that occur prior to the jury's verdict. 79 Unlike the award of future
pecuniary damages,8 0 an award of future non-pecuniary damage is not re-
duced to present value.8 1 If an injury shortens the plaintiff's life,82 he may
recover pecuniary damages for his "lost years." 83  However, the majority of
courts refuse to permit recovery for non-pecuniary damages for the "lost
years." 8
4
79. See Cunningham v. Pennsylvania, 55 F. Supp. 1012 (E.D.N.Y. 1944); Standard Oil Co.
v. Shields, 58 Ariz. 239, 119 P.2d 116 (1941); James, supra note 1, at 604.
80. See text and accompanying note 37 supra.
81. United States v. Harue Hayashi, 282 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1960); Porter v. Funkhouser, 79
Nev. 273, 382 P.2d 216 (1963); DOBBS, supra note 1, at 574.
82. In many states, mortality tables are used as evidence of a personal injury victim's life
expectancy. See STATE BAR OF TExAs, PERSONAL INJURY LITIGATION IN TExAs, § 9.4 (1961);
ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 17, at § 34.04; IOWA UNIFORM JURY IN-
STRUCTIONS, § 3.16(a) (1960). When the use of tables is permitted, however, the instructions
uniformly state that the figure shown for life expectancy is not conclusive. Rather, the jury
should consider evidence of the plaintiff's health, habits and other activities bearing in mind
that some persons live longer than the average. Thus, in determining how long the plaintiff
would have lived had the injury not occurred, the jury is not confined to evidence of ordinary
life expectancy, but can consider factors affecting life expectancy that are peculiar to the plain-
tiff.
83. See text and accompanying notes 35-37 supra.
84. See Farrington v. Stoddard, 115 F.2d 96 (1st Cir. 1940); Rhone v. Fisher, 224 Md. 223,
167 A.2d 773 (1961); DOBBS, supra note 1, at 549. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, at 304 states the
following:
If it appeared that the plaintiff could have expected (at the time of trial) to live for
twenty years, but by reason of his injury he can only reasonably anticipate a further
life span of ten years, then he should recover the present value of what he could
expect to earn in a life of twenty years, less what he will actually earn for the ten
years of probable life, and should also recover for such expenses and pain and suf-
fering as will probably be incurred during the estimated period of ten years.
The English have made some inroads. Unlike the majority of American courts, British courts
have recognized a separate non-pecuniary element of damages for loss of life expectancy. See
Yorkshire Electricity Board v. Naylor, [1967] 2 All E.R. 1 (H.L.) (20-year old electrician ap-
prentice electrocuted and awarded £500 for loss of life expectancy); Andrews v. Freeborough,
[1966] 2 All E.R. 721 (C.A.) (eight-year old girl dies while in coma and awarded £500); Wise v.
Kaye [1962] 1 Q.B. 638 (23-year old woman lies in coma for three years and awarded £400 for
loss of life expectancy); Bishop v. Cunard White Star, Ltd., [1950] 2 All E.R. 22 (P.C.) (39-year
old petty officer's life expectancy cut short and awarded £350; 19-year old bachelor seaman
awarded £500); Benham v. Gambling [1941] A.C. 157 (two and a half year old child injured,
falls unconscious and dies hours later, recovery granted but limited); Roach v. Yates, [1938] 1
K.B. 256 (life expectancy shortened from 30 to 16 years is compensable damage even if victim
not conscious of the reduction); Rose v. Ford, [1937] A.C. 826, 859 (loss of life expectancy
considered a loss of a "good thing in itself"); Flint v. Lovell, [1935] 1 K.B. 354 (70-year old man
with 8-10 year life expectancy reduced to one year is awarded damages for the loss); See also
DOBBS, supra note 1, at 549; Fleming, supra note 37.
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Representing the minority approach, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
recognized, in part, a right of recovery for non-pecuniary damages for lost
years. 85 While English courts, for example, base recovery on proof of "loss
of life expectancy" alone,8 6 recovery for non-pecuniary damages for the "lost
years" was based solely on probable components of damages, such as lost
ability to dance, bowl, or swim.8 7 Although in most American jurisdictions
the rule remains that non-pecuniary damages for the "lost years" are not
recoverable, 88 it seems highly unlikely that many defense counsel would
voluntarily introduce evidence of the plaintiff's shortened life expectancy to
obtain the benefit of this substantive rule. On the contrary, it is suggested
that neither the plaintiff nor the defendant generally introduces such evi-
dence. In such an event, compensation for pain and suffering is based upon
life expectancy set forth in mortality tables. 89
In arguing for the recovery of "pain and suffering" damages, attorneys
frequently will argue that a certain period of time, such as an hour, is worth
a certain amount of money. 90 Some courts have held that attorneys cannot
use mathematical formulae to argue "pain and suffering." 91  In support of
their refusal to permit the mathematical or per diem argument, some courts
state that the argument is not grounded on the evidence. 92  Others appar-
ently fear that the jury will be unduly impressed by the apparent reliability
of the mathematical calculations. 93  Most courts, however, have rejected
these arguments and permit counsel to use the mathematical approach, 94
In American courts, where a plaintiff is aware of his reduced life expectancy, mental suffering
has been held compensable. Rhone v. Fisher, 224 Md. 223, 167 A.2d 773 (1961); Choicener v.
Walters Amusement Agency, 269 Mass. 341, 168 N.E. 918 (1929). See also DOBBS, supra note
1, at 549.
85. Downie v. United States Lines Co., 359 F.2d 344 (3d Cir. 1966).
86. DOBBS, supra note 1, at 549.
87. 359 F.2d at 347 n.3. The Court of Appeals remanded the Downie case because the trial
court's instructions did not properly specify the factors that the jury should consider in awarding
damages based on loss of life expectancy.
88. See note 84 supra.
89. See note 82 supra.
90. DOBBS, supra note 1, at 546 noted:
If the calculation is put on the basis of an hour, and a figure of $1 per hour is used
for 16 hours a day, the resulting figure is $5840 per year. On this basis a pain and
suffering award for a plaintiff who will have permanent pain over a 20-year lifespan
is $116,800. The figure can easily be manipulated by focusing on narrower time
segments. For instance, "5 cents per minute" is three times the above figure,
though it might impress many a juror as a modest sum for the pain plaintiff will
suffer.
91. See DOBBS, supra note 1, at 546, citing Caley v. Manicke, 24 Ill. 2d 390, 182 N.E.24
206 (1962); Caylor v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 190 Kan. 261, 374 P.2d 53 (1962);
Henne v. Balick, 51 Del. 369, 146 A.2d 394 (1958).
92. See DOBBS, supra note 1, at 546, citing Henne v. Balick, 51 Del. 369, 376, 146 A.2d
394, 398 (1958).
93. See DOBBS, supra note 1, at 546, citing Caylor v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry.
Co., 190 Kan. 261, 374 P.2d 53 (1962).
94. See Baron Tube Co. v. Transp. Ins. Co., 365 F.2d 858 (5th Cir. 1966).
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reasoning that the mathematical argument does not purport to be eviden-
tiary, but is simply an illustrative way of helping the jury to understand the
extent of the plaintiff's injuries. 95
B. Disability and Disfigurement
An instruction treating disfigurement as a separate element of damage
creates a definite likelihood of plaintiff overcompensation. Problems as-
sociated with the term disfigurement arise chiefly from the fact that disfig-
urement is sometimes characterized as an element of damage. Rather, disfig-
urement should be considered an injury, which like other injuries, can
cause several elements of damage. For example, assume that plaintiff is dis-
figured from a permanent scar which is the result of a facial cut sustained in
an automobile accident. As a result of this injury, plaintiff may suffer pain,
humiliation, mental suffering, loss of normal life and any other compensable
element of damage. Thus, if plaintiff happens to be employed as a model,
loss of earning capacity also will be an element of damage. Of course, ex-
penses for medical services are compensable. Where disfigurement is treated
as an element of damage rather than an injury, counsel may argue, "How
much is it worth for this young gal to go through life with a scar on her
face?" If counsel also asks for separate compensation for other resulting ele-
ments of damage-such as mental suffering, humiliation or loss of normal
life-the damages may overlap, resulting in overcompensation to the plain-
tiff.
In Houston Transit Co. v. Felder,96 the Texas Supreme Court faced the
argument that recovery for disfigurement overlaps recovery for other ele-
ments of damage. In Felder, an assault and battery action, the trial court
instructed the jury to compensate the plaintiff independently for pain, men-
tal anguish and disfigurement. The supreme court implicitly recognized the
inherent danger of overlapping damages, yet concluded that the instruction
would not lead to double recovery for mental anguish. The court apparently
reached this conclusion on the ground that the jury was instructed to give
only one answer for the total of plaintiff's damages.9 7 The weakness of this
95. See DOBBS, supra note 1, at 546, citing Beagle v. Vasold, 65 Cal. 2d 166, 53 Cal.
Rptr. 129, 417 P.2d 673 (1966). That opinion stated that "[i]f the jury must infer from what it
sees and hears at the trial that a certain amount of money is warranted as compensation . , *
there is no justification for prohibiting counsel for making a similar deduction in argument." Id.
at 176, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 134, 417 P.2d at 678.
96. 146 Tex. 428, 208 S.W.2d 880 (1948).
97. Id. at 434, 208 S.W,2d at 883. The court reasoned as follows: "the jury's consideration of
... [damages] must be appraised in the light of ordinary reason and everyday experience.
Distinctions which are too fine are apt to lead to needless perplexities and purely legalistic
results." Id. Compare International-Great, N.R. v. King, 41 S.W.2d 234 (Tex. Comm'n App.
1931), with the cases cited therein indicating that if separate answer lines are provided for each
element, the instruction would be found improper. In King, the court held that separate answer
lines for "bodily injuries," "bodily inconveniences," "physical pain and suffering" and "de-
creased earning capacity" permitted double recovery and were calculated to confuse and mis-
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rationale is that the danger of overcompensation exists whether or not the
jury is instructed to give a separate answer for each element of damage.
Overcompensation is precisely the intrinsic danger in an instruction to con-
sider mental anguish as a separate element of damage when it also comprises
an element of damage arising from the disfiguring injury.
Similarly, overcompensation may arise from recognition of disability as an
element of damage. 98 In such cases, counsel may argue that plaintiff is no
longer a whole human being because he or she will have to go through life
with only one arm. How much is that worth? Such an argument equates the
element of disability with a statement of injury. Following such an argu-
ment, the juror might consider the instruction to compensate the plaintiff for
the entire injury, with no criterion of damage. Thus, with respect to a
hypothetical plaintiff who has lost an arm, the jury might view the loss of the
arm as the disability and the instruction to compensate the plaintiff for "dis-
ability" as an instruction to compensate for the loss of the arm. The jury,
however, also will be instructed to award several other elements of damage
for the loss of the arm. Accordingly, the plaintiff's recovery for disability
actually may overlap recovery for other elements of damage, such as pain,
inconvenience, physical suffering, humiliation, and most importantly, mental
suffering.
The concepts of disability and disfigurement also include the element of
diminished ability to lead a normal life. 99 Recovery for diminished ability to
lead a normal life compensates plaintiff for those non-pecuniary aspects of
damage relating to plaintiff's inability to pursue or obtain the pleasurable
aspects of life, such as recreation, hobbies, enjoyment of one's senses, mar-
riage and children. 100  The majority view permits compensation for the loss
of a normal life. 10 1
lead the jury. The Felder court stated that its holding did not run counter to King. 146 Tex.
434, 208 S.W.2d 883. See also O'Quinn, supra note 52, at 206, citing International-Great N.R.
v. King, 41 S.W.2d 234, (Tex. Comm'n App. 1931) wherein it was noted that "[tihe humiliation
of disfigurement is part of mental anguish; and if because of separate answer lines, the jury is
called upon to give a full award for disfigurement, there can be a danger of double recovery
such that an instruction may be necessary." Id. at 237.
98. See, e.g., ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 17, at § 30.04; MIN-
NESOTA JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES-CIVIL, § 155 (1963); SOUTH DAKOTA PATTERN JURY
INSTRUCTIONS--CIVIL, supra note 17, at § 30.04 and other states listed in note 17 supra.
99. Of those jurisdictions studied, only Florida has a separate instruction for loss of normal
life:
If you find that the plaintiff has been permanently injured to any extent, or will
continue to suffer therefrom, you may take into consideration his future pain and
suffering, and the effect the same may have upon his normal life; and any impair-
ment of his earning capacity, and his future loss of earnings as a direct and proxi-
mate result of his injuries.
USSERY, INSTRUCTIONS FOR FLORIDA, § 417 at 352 (1954).
100. Adkins v. Kelley, 244 Ark. 199, 204, 424 S.W.2d 373, 375 (1968); Lambert, supra note
71, at 198 and cases cited therein. See also cases cited in notes 102 & 103, infra.
101. See Pierce v. New York Cent. R.R. Co., 409 F.2d 1392 (6th Cir. 1969); McAlister v.
Carl, 233 Md. 446, 197 A.2d 140 (1964); DOBBS, supra note 1, at 548-49; Comment, Loss of
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Damage awards based on the loss of ability to lead a normal life have been
approved in many situations, including one's diminished prospects of mar-
riage and inability to bear children. 10 2  In arguing for recovery for loss of a
normal life, plaintiff's counsel should, where supported by the evidence,
request compensation for plaintiff's inability to engage in non-economic re-
creational activities as part of plaintiff's loss of normal life. 103
Furthermore, most courts have held that recovery for loss of a normal life
is independent of consideration of recovery for lost earning capacity or for
pain and suffering. a0 4  A minority of courts, however, have denied recovery
for loss of a normal life altogether.105
Enjoyment of Life-Should it be a Compensable Element of Personal Injury Damages? 11
WAKE FoREST L. REV. 459, 466 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Comment].
102. See Riggs v. Metcalf, 315 S.W.2d 791 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1958) (plaintiff was unable to swim,
dance, or be a housewife); Davis v. Zucker, 106 N.E.2d 169 (Ohio App. 1951) (woman suffered
diminished prospects of marriage). Damages also would be appropriate for loss of ability to have
children. See Denver & Rio Grande Ry. v. Harris, 122 U.S. 597 (1887) wherein the Court
noted:
One of the consequences of the wound received by the plaintiff at the hands of
defendant's servants was the loss of the power to have offspring-a loss resulting
directly and proximately from the nature of the wound. Evidence of this fact was,
therefore, admissible, although the declaration does not, in terms, specify such loss
as one of the results of the wound. The court very properly instructed the jury that
such impotency, if caused by the defendant's wrong, might be considered in es-
timating any compensatory damages to which the plaintiff might be found, under all
the evidence, to be entitled.
Id. at 608.
103. In Honecutt v. Wabash R.R, Co., 337 S.W.2d 50 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1960), for example, the
court upheld the award of damages for the following consequences of the plaintiff's injury: he
was forced to forego playing ball, engaging in scouting activities, and playing pinochle with his
wife. Id. at 52.
One commentator noted that in awarding damages for loss of a normal life, courts have consi-
dered the following factors: "loss of the sense of smell or taste; and inability to dance, bowl,
swim, or engage in other recreational activities; an ability to engage in usual family activities; or
even a diminished capacity to enjoy old age." Comment, supra note 101, at 459. See also cases
cited in Lambert, supra note 71, at 198-99.
Whether or not a plaintiff suffered a reduction in earning capacity, a forced change in occupa-
tion also might lead to recovery for diminished capacity to enjoy life. See McAlister v. Carl, 233
Md. 446, 197 A.2d 140 (1964). In McAlister, the court stated that although evidence of a forced
change in occupation was admissible to show loss of enjoyment of life, the plaintiff's evidence
was not substantial. Id. at 457-58, 197 A.2d at 146.
A change in personality is also an injury that justifies compensation for such elements as
mental suffering and loss of a normal life. See SUTHERLAND, supra note 1, at 4469:
When a healthy person is thus made permanently an invalid; deprived largely of his
capacity to enjoy life; suddenly transformed from a mental state of cheerfulness and
hope to another of melancholy by day and unrest and bad dreams by night, is he
not entitled to some compensation for this physical and psychical alteration in him-
self.
104. For example, in Shebester, Inc. v, Ford, 361 P.2d 200 (Okla. Sup. Ct. 1961), the court
approved an instruction that allowed the jury to compensate the plaintiff for loss of earning
capacity, pain and suffering, and "permanent loss of health and detriment to his body as a
whole." Id. at 201. The Shebester court held that recovery for loss of health was equivalent to a
recovery for permanent impairment. Id. at 203. This resulted in a reduction of the plaintiff's
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In denying recovery for diminished ability to lead a normal life, some
minority view courts have noted the difficulty in measuring the recovery. 10 6
However, difficulty in measurement does not indicate that a right to recov-
ery should not exist.1 0 7  The general rule is that when the cause and exis-
tence of damages are established, courts will not deny recovery because the
damages are difficult to ascertain. 108 Furthermore, a recovery for pain,
mental suffering, or humiliation is arguably as speculative as a recovery for
the diminished capacity to enjoy life.109 Accepting these arguments, most
courts rightly reject in whole or in part the view that recovery is too specu-
lative. 110
capacity to pursue the course of life that she might have otherwise pursued. Id. at 204, quoting
Enid City By. Co. v. Reynolds, 34 Okla. 405, 410, 126 P.2d 193, 195 (1912). Moreover, such
impairment was distinct from her recovery for lost earning capacity. Id. at 203.
See cases cited in note 102 supra. Some courts have held that damages for loss of enjoyment
of life are an aspect of damages for pain and suffering. See District of Columbia v. Woodbury,
136 U.S. 450, 459 (1890); Comment, supra note 101, at 468. In any event, recovery for di-
minished capacity to enjoy life is compensable in addition to plaintiff's mental suffering over the
loss of enjoyment of life. Loss of normal life also is distinct from the element of inconvenience.
105. For example, in Hogan v. Sante Fe Trail Transp. Co., 148 Kan. 720, 85 P.2d 28 (1938),
the plaintiff's little finger was injured, preventing her from playing the violin. Although the
plaintiff earned relatively little as a musician, she was an accomplished violinist and playing the
violin was important to her. Id. at 726, 85 P.2d at 31. The plaintiff testified that the violin "was
my life work. It is just part of me. Every place I go, if I don't have my violin why I wonder
where it is." Id. The jury awarded the plaintiff four thousand dollars for loss of the enjoyment of
playing the violin. On appeal, the Kansas Supreme Court held that the award was too specula-
tive and that the verdict permitted double compensation because the jury had made a separate
award for pain and suffering. See Comment, supra note 101, at 461, for a discussion of the
Hogan case.
See also City of Columbus v. Strassner, 124 Ind. 482, 25 N.E. 65 (1890); Locke v. Interna-
tional-Great N.R. 25 Tex. Civ. App. 145, 60 S.W. 314 (1901); DoBBs, supra note 1, at 548
n.58.
106. See City of Columbus v. Strassner, 124 Ind. 482, 489, 25 N.E. 65, 67 (1890).
107. Comment, supra note 101, at 465.
108. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, at § 27.
109. See Comment, supra note 101, at 465; Merrill v. Los Angeles Gas & Elec. Co., 158
Cal. 499, 513, 111 P. 534, 540 (1910):
Mental suffering differs in degree with individuals, with their sex, circumstances,
positions in life. But so do men differ in sensing physical pain; so do they differ in
the mental suffering occasioned by physical pain alonc. . . . Yet the law has scales
by which it measures the compensation for suffering.of this kind, and measures it,
of course, in terms of money.
110. See note 101 supra. Powers v. City of Augusta, 191 F. 647 (E.D. Ky. 1911), was de-
cided prior to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64 (1938). In Powers, d woman suffered a broken kneecap which permanently impaired the
use of her leg. Rejecting the rule that damages for permanent injury should be limited to loss of
earning capacity that was outlined in Lexington By. Co. v. Herring, 29 Ky. 794, 798-99, 96
S.W. 558, 562 (1906), the Powers court held that when the plaintiff is a wage-earner and the
injury reduces her earning capacity, substantial justice might be done even if her recovery is
limited to pain, suffering, and loss of earnings. 191 F. at 655.
However, when the plaintiff is not a wage-earner, or when the injury does not affect her
ability to earn money, it would be unjust to limit her recovery to loss of earnings. The court
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C. Nature, Extent and Duration
The jury instructions under consideration recognize "the nature, extent,
and duration" of the plaintiff's injury as a separate compensable element of
damage. The Committee Notes following Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction
30.02 state that "[i]t is difficult to imagine an injury case in which this in-
struction will not be appropriate." " Thus, trial judges are required to
instruct juries to compensate the plaintiff for the nature, extent, and dura-
tion of his injury in addition to the various elements of damage that resulted
from the injury.
To analyze the recovery for the "nature, extent, and duration" of an in-
jury, it will be helpful to return to our hypothetical plaintiff who is alleging
in his personal injury action that the defendant's negligence caused the loss
of his arm. The nature of the injury is the loss of an arm. The extent of the
injury is the complete loss of the arm. Finally, the duration of the injury is
permanent. Thus, pursuant to a jury instruction of "nature, extent and dura-
tion," the judge is instructing the jury to compensate the plaintiff for the
complete and permanent loss of an arm. In addition, the judge also will
instruct the jury to compensate the plaintiff for those elements of damage
resulting from the complete and permanent loss of one arm. 112 Therefore,
the jury must assign a value to the plaintiff's complete and permanent loss of
an arm, with a separate value assigned to those elements of damage that flow
from the loss of the arm. 113  Where such dual recovery is awarded by the
jury, the result must of necessity be overcompensation to the personal injury
plaintiff.114 Although a few of the thirty states examined recognize "nature,
extent and duration" as a separate element of damage, 115 only the instruc-
tions in Illinois, South Dakota and Washington in fact suggest that "nature,
extent and duration" should be treated as a separate element. Moreover, the
cases cited in the comments to the Illinois instructions which list "nature,
concluded that when a permanent injury does not affect a plaintiff's earning capacity, justice
requires that the jury be permitted to assess its effects apart from loss of earning capacity. The
court continued:
But, where the plaintiff is not a wage-earner or otherwise a money maker, as is the
case here, or where, though he or she may be such, the permanent injury does not
affect his or her capacity to earn or make money, there is little or no room to
include impairment of power to earn money as an element of damage, and substan-
tial justice will not be done in limiting the measure of recovery as above.
id.
111. ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL, supra note 17, at § 3.02, Notes on
Use.
112. For a similar situation see text and accompanying notes 96-98 supra.
113. ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS--CIVIL, supra note 17, at § 30.04-30.07.
114. Overcompensation is particularly likely in light of the "blackboard" argument. See text
and accompanying notes 22-25 supra.
115. See note 19 supra.
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extent, and duration" as an element of damage, fail to support its treatment
as a separate element. 116
The better treatment of "nature, extent, and duration" appears in the jury
instructions for Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, and Colorado. In these
states, the instructions treat the nature, extent, and duration of the injury as
a measure of the other elements of damage and not as a separate compensa-
ble element.1 1 7 Pursuant to these instructions, the amount that the jury
awards for the various compensable elements of damage that flow from an
injury depends on the injury's nature, extent, and duration. Thus, these
116. The comment to ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTION-CIVIL, § 30.02 cites three
cases as authority for the proposition that the nature, extent, and duration of an injury consti-
tute a separate element of damage. In the first case, Donk Bros. Coal & Coke Co. v. Thil, 228
III. 233, 81 N.E.857 (1907), a dynamite explosion at the defendant's mine injured the plaintiff.
The court's only reference to "nature, extent, and duration" was a quotation from the trial
judge's instruction to the jury. The trial court had instructed the jury that, in assessing the
plaintiff's damages, the jury should "consider" the nature, extent, and duration of the plaintiff's
injury. Furthermore, in the same instruction, the judge stated that the jury should "consider"
other factors, including: "all the facts and circumstances as proven by the evidence," suffering,
medical expenses, and lost earnings. Id. at 241, 81 N.E. at 860.
Although the Thil court approved the trial court's instruction, the court did not discuss how
the jury's consideration of the nature, extent, and duration of the injury should enter into the
computation of the plaintiff's damages. Id. at 244, 81 N.E. at 861. Thus, Thil does not support
the proposition that the nature, extent, and duration of the injury constitute a separate com-
pensable element of damage.
In the second case, MeDaniels v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 302 II. App. 332, 23 N.E.2d 785 (4th
Dist. 1939), the plaintiff was injured when the defendant's employees dropped a wooden girder
off of a bridge where the employees were working. The trial court instructed the jury to "take
into consideration" the duration of the plaintiff's injuries. Id. at 350, 23 N.E.2d at 792. In
addition to the duration of the injury, the trial judge also instructed the jury to consider the
extent of the injuries caused by the employee's negligence, the plaintiff's past and future pain
and anguish, and finally the extent to which the plaintiff was unable to pursue any occupation
that he could have pursued prior to the injury. Id. at 349-51, 23 N.E.2d at 792. As in Thil, the
McDaniels court neither stated that "nature, extent, and duration" was a compensable element
of damage, nor discussed the proper consideration of the nature, extent, and duration of the
injury.
Finally, in the third case, Sprickerhoff v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 323 III. App. 340, 55
N.E.2d 532 (4th Dist. 1944), the trial court instructed the jury to consider the nature and
extent of the plaintiff's injuries. As in Thil, the Sprickerhoff court did not discuss whether the
jury should consider "nature, extent, and duration" as a separate element of damage. Id. at
348-51, 55 N.E.2d at 536-37. Thus, the Illinois cases cited in the comment to § 30.02 do not
support the proposition that "nature, extent, and duration" should be considered as a separate
compensable element of damage in Illinois personal injury cases.
Furthermore, the Indiana cases on point also do not support the proposition that "nature,
extent, and duration" should be considered a separate compensable element of damage. See
McClure v. Miller, 229 Ind. 422, 435, 98 N.E.2d 498, 503-504 (1951); City of Goshen v. Eng-
land, 119 Ind. 368, 378, 21 N.E. 977, 981 (1889).
117. See MICHIGAN STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS- CIVIL, § 30.01 (Supp. 1972):
If you decide that the plaintiff is entitled to damages, it is your duty to determine
the amount of money which reasonably, fairly and adequately compensates him for
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instructions avoid the problems that arise when the court instructs the jury
to compensate the plaintiff once for the nature, extent, and duration of the
injury and again for the various elements of damage that the injury pro-
duced.""
The view that the nature, extent, and duration of the injury should be
considered a measure of the various elements of damage, on first blush would
seem to have been rejected by the Arkansas Supreme Court in Adkins v.
Kelley. 119 In Adkins, the plaintiff was an employee of the defendant's res-
taurant, who sustained an eight-inch laceration of his neck. At trial, the
plaintiff requested an instruction that included the nature, extent, duration,
and permanency of the injury as a separate compensable element of dam-
each of the elements of damage which you decide has resulted from the negligence
of the defendant, taking into account the nature and extent of the injury.
You should include each of the following elements of damage which you decide
has been sustained by the plaintiff to the present time:
[here insert the elements of damage by reading the applicable instructions, such
as:
30.02 Pain and Suffering, etc.
30.03 Disability and Disfigurement
30.04 Aggravation of Pre-existing Ailment or Condition]
In Wisconsin, in compensating the plaintiff for past and future disability, the jury is in-
structed as follows:
[clonsider the nature of his injuries, the effect produced thereby in the past, and
the effect which it is reasonably certain such injuries will produce in the future;
bearing in mind his age, his prior mental and physical condition, and the probably
[sic] duration of his life.
WISCONSIN JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL, § 1750 (1962). However, this instruction regarding the
measurement of damages does not appear in the Wisconsin instructions concerning other ele-
ments of damage. Similarly, the instructions in Minnesota and Colorado state that the jury
should consider the nature and extent of the injury in assessing the elements of damage. See
MINNESOTA JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES, supra note 17, at § 155; COLORADO JURY
INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL, § 6:1 (1969).
118. See text and accompanying notes 112-14 supra. The view that the nature, extent, and
duration of the injury should be considered a measure of the various elements of damage was
approved in Caley v. Manicke, 29 I11. App. 2d 323, 173 N.E.2d 209 (1961) (Dove, J., dissent-
ing):
Every juror is acquainted with pain and suffering and compensation for these ele-
ments of damage must rest in the discretion of the jury, guided by common sense.
And it is proper to instruct the jury in cases of this character that it is their prov-
ince to determine the damages plaintiff should recover; that in so doing they should
fix an amount of money which will reasonably and fairly compensate the plaintiff for
the elements of damage proven by the evidence including pain and suffering ex-
perienced and reasonably certain to be experienced in the future as a result of the
injuries the plaintiff sustained; that in determining the amount of plaintiff's damages
the jury should take into consideration the nature, extent and duration of his in-
juries and their verdict must be based on evidence and not upon speculation, guess
or conjecture.
Id. at 349, 173 N.E.2d at 221.
119. 244 Ark. 199, 424 S.W.2d 373 (1968).
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age. l2 0 The trial court, however, modified the plaintiff's instruction. The
court instructed the jury to compensate the plaintiff for the various elements
of damage that he suffered and to consider the nature, extent, duration, and
permanency of the injury as a measure of the damages to assign to the ele-
ments. 121
On appeal, the Arkansas Supreme Court rejected the trial court's modifi-
cation and concluded that the recovery for "permanency" of the injury com-
pensated the plaintiff for "the non-pecuniary, non-pain aspects of the dis-
abled condition, such as deprivation of a normal life and of a chance to
pursue non-economic hobbies or recreation." 122 The court cited Shebester,
120. The plaintiff requested the following instruction:
If you find for the plaintiff, you must then fix the amount of money which you
find will reasonably and fairly compensate him for any of the following elements of
damages:
1. The nature, extent, duration and permanency of the injury.
2. The reasonable expense of any necessary medical care, treatment and services
received.
3. Any pain, suffering and mental anguish experienced in the past and reasonably
certain to be experienced in the future.
4. The value of any earning lost or reasonably certain to be lost in the future.
5. The present vlaue of any loss of earning capacity or ability to earn in the
future.
6. Any scars and disfigurement or visible results of his injury.
Id. at 202, 424 S.W.2d at 374.
121. The trial court instructed the jury:
If you find for the plaintiff, you must then fix the amount of money which you
find will reasonably and fairly compensate him for any of the following elements of
damages:
1. The reasonable expense of any necessary medical care, treatment and services
received.
2. Any pain, suffering and mental anguish experienced in the past and reasonably
certain to be experienced in the future.
3. the value of any earnings lost.
4. The present value of any loss of earning capacity or ability to earn in the
future.
5. Any embarrassment or mental anguish suffered by reason of any scars and
disfigurements or visible results of his injury.
In arriving at these amounts, you may take into consideration the nature, extent,
duration and permanency of his injuries.
Whether any of these things have been proved is for you to decide.
Id. at 202-03, 424 S.W.2d at 374-75. In rejecting the plaintiff's request to treat "nature, extent,
duration, and permanency" as a separate compensable element, the trial court failed to follow
the ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTION -CIvIL, § 2202 (1974). The appellate court found
this to be in error. Id. at 203, 424 S.W.2d at 375.
122. 224 Ark. at 204, 424 S.W.2d at 375, citing Lambert, supra note 71, at 198. In defining
the element of "permanency," the court also cited Woods, Earnings and Earning Capacity as
Elements of Damage in Personal Injury Litigation, 18 ARK. L. REV. 304 (1965) where it was
noted:
Loss of earning capacity as an element of damages is sometimes confused with per-
manency of the injury, which is universally recognized as a separate element of
damage. A lawyer or minister might lose an arm with no loss of earning capacity,
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Inc. v. Ford,123 where the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that "permanent
loss of health and detriment to [the] body as a whole" was compensable.1 24
As previously noted, the court in Shebester also concluded that recovery for
permanent loss of health was independent of any recovery for pain, mental
suffering and loss of earning capacity. Thus, adopting the principles articu-
lated in Shebester, the Adkins court held that the nature, extent, duration
and permanency of an injury constituted a separate compensable element of
damage. 12 5
The element, however, of damage which the Adkins court labeled as "na-
ture, extent, duration, permanency," equivalent to recovery for diminished
ability to lead a normal life, is usually recoverable under the rubric of disa-
bility. 126 The trial court in Adkins, in accordance with the Arkansas jury
instructions, did not instruct the jury to compensate the plaintiff separately
for disability. 127  The Arkansas approach is similar to that employed in In-
diana, where disability is not an element but permanency is. 128 However,
in Illinois, Washington and South Dakota, three other states in which "na-
ture, extent, and duration" constitutes a separate element of damage, courts
also instruct the jury to compensate the plaintiff separately for disability. 129
Unlike the plaintiff in Adkins, plaintiffs in Illinois, Washington and South
Dakota can recover for diminished ability to lead a normal life without in-
structing the jury to award separate compensation for the nature, extent,
duration and permanency of an injury. Thus, the Arkansas court's decision in
but he would still be entitled to recover for the permanency of his injury. A hope-
less mental defective with no earning capacity can recover for loss of his sight,
because he has sustained a permanent injury. A recent Oklahoma decision makes
plain the distinction between these two separate elements of damages against the
contention that a double recovery was being allowed. It has been said that a per-
manent injury is one that deprives plaintiff of his right to live his life in comfort and
ease without added inconvenience or diminution of physical vigor, but there may
be no pecuniary loss of loss of earning capacity in conjunction.
Id. at 305-06.
123. 361 P.2d 200 (Okla. Sup. Ct. 1961). See note 104 supra and accompanying text.
124. Id. at 201.
125. 244 Ark. at 204-05, 424 S.W.2d at 375.
126. See notes 98-100 and accompanying text supra. The Shebester court stated the following:
"It is a rule in personal-injury actions that recovery may be had for permanent injuries or
lasting impairment of health-that is, for the loss resulting from complete or partial disability in
health, mind, or person thereby occasioned." 361 P.2d at 203, citing 15 AM. JUR., Damages §
75 (1938). Instructions in states which instruct juries to compensate the plaintiff for "perma-
nency" do not also list "disability" as a separate compensable element of damage. See INDIANA
PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 17, at 9.01(b); ARKANSAS MODEL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL, supra note 17, at § 2202.
127. "Disability" is not one of the compensable elements of damage in the ARKANSAS MODEL
JURY INSTRUCTIONS.
128. See Appendix and note 126 supra.
129. ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL, supra note 17, at § 30.04; SOUTH
DAKOTA PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIvIL, § 30.04 (1968); WASHINGTON PATTERN JURY
INSTRUCTIONS- CIVIL § 30.04 (1967).
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Adkins does not support the view that "nature, extent, and duration" of an
injury should constitute a separate compensable element of damage if either
disability or loss of ability to lead a normal life is also included as a separate
element. In summary, the nature, extent, and duration of an injury should
be treated in a pattern jury instruction as a measure of the compensable
elements of damage and not as an element of damage.
D. Aggravation of Pre-existing Ailment or Condition
If the plaintiff at the time of the accident was already suffering from an
ailment or condition, a defendant must compensate the plaintiff only for the
aggravation of such ailment or condition resulting from the negligence or
wrongful conduct. Thus, as with nature, extent and duration, this element of
damage, when properly understood, is merely a measure of compensable
injuries. In other words, the defendant is responsible for compensating
plaintiff for pre-existing ailments or conditions only to the degree that the
negligence resulted in an alteration in either the nature, extent, or duration
of the plaintiff's ailment or condition. Any change in the plaintiff's ailment
or condition, being an injury in itself, is measured by its consequences to
the plaintiff in the form of the appropriate elements of damage.
PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS
The jury instructions currently employed in the jurisdictions reviewed
may be divided roughly into three categories. Many states employ jury in-
structions in which each element of damage is contained in a separate in-
struction, with no clear instruction given concerning how each element of
damage should be measured in light of the injuries proven. 130 In the sec-
ond type of instruction, each of the various elements of damage, rather than
being presented in separate instructions, are all contained in instructions
dealing with disability and past damages. These instructions differ from those
in most states in that they do attempt to guide the jury in assessing the
elements of damage. 131 They also are lengthy and the manner in which the
130. See, e.g., ALABAMA PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL § 11.04-11.11 (1974); IN-
DIANA PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS; supra note 17, at §§ 9.01(a)-9.01(h).
131. See, e.g., WISCONSIN JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL, § 1750 (1962):
PERSONAL INJURIES: PAST AND FUTURE DISABILITY
Question- inquires as to what sum of money will fairly and reasonably
compensate the plaintiff for the personal injuries he sustained as a result of the
accident.
You will answer this question by inserting such a sum of money as you are satis-
fied will fairly and reasonably compensate the plaintiff for such pain and suffering
(disfigurement) and such impairment of his (mental and bodily) health, physical
abilities and bodily functions as you are satisfied he has suffered to date and is
reasonably certain to suffer in the future as a consequence of his injuries.
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elements of damage are grouped may confuse the jury. The third type of
instruction lists each element of damage which has a basis in the evidence
separately within a single instruction. In addition, the jury also measures
each element of damage by its nature, extent and duration.'
3 2
As has been demonstrated, the existing jury instructions contain certain
overlapping elements of damage. Accordingly, attorneys may be arguing for
recovery of the same loss under more than one label. In response to these
problems, a viable proposal for jury instruction reform should include in-
structions to the jury as to each separate recoverable element of damage and
as to guidelines in measuring an injury but not as to injuries themselves.
This would enable courts and attorneys to counteract arguments likely to
result in double recovery of compensable damages. In addition, such instruc-
tions should assist the jury in its deliberation so as to insure that no com-
pensable items of damage are overlooked. Finally, the instructions must be
comprehensible to the jury in light of the arguments presented by counsel.
The following proposed jury instructions conform to the third type discus-
sed above. Only elements of damage and not characterizations of injuries are
included. Finally, the amount of compensation for each element depends on
the jury's assessment of the injury's nature, extent, and duration.
Proposed Instructions
Measure of Damages-General Instruction
If you decide for the plaintiff on the question of liability, you must then
fix the amount of money which will reasonably and fairly compensate him
In arriving at your answer to this question you will consider the humiliation,
embarrassment, worry and mental distress, if any, which the plaintiff has encured
[sic] in the past and is reasonably certain to endure in the future; consider also to
what extent his injuries have impaired and will impair his ability to enjoy the nor-
mal activities, pleasures and benefits of life. Take into consideration the nature of
his injuries, the effect produced thereby in the past and the effect it is reasonably
certain such injuries will produce in the future; bearing in mind his age, his prior
mental and physical condition and the probably [sic] duration of his life.
If you are satisfied that the plaintiff has suffered an impairment of this future
earning capacity as a natural consequence of his injuries, you will then include in
your answer to Question such further sum as will fairly and reasonably com-
pensate him for such impairment of earning capacity. The amount, if any, to be
awarded by you as damages for impairment of his earning capacity is the difference
between what the plaintiff will reasonably be able to earn in the future in view of
his injuries, and what he would have been able to earn had he not been injured.
132. See ILLINOIS PAIrERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL, supra note 17, at §§ 30.01-30.16;
MICHIGAN STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL, § 30.00-30.08 (1972). MICHIGAN STANDARD
JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 17, at § 30.01:
If you decide that the plaintiff is entitled to damages, it is your duty to determine
the amount of money which reasonably, fairly and adequately compensates him for
each of the elements of damage which you decide resulted from the negligence of
the defendant, taking into account the nature and extent of the injury.
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for any of the following elements of damage proved by the evidence to
have resulted from the negligence [wrongful conduct] of the defendant:
[Here insert those elements of damage 1-9 which have a basis in the
evidence.]
Whether any of these elements of damage have been proved by the
evidence is for you to determine.
In fixing the amount of money to compensate the plaintiff for each
proven element of damage, you should consider the nature, extent and
duration of the injury.
Elements of Damage
1. Loss of Earnings-Past and Future
The value of [earnings] [profits] [salaries] lost [and the present cash
value of the (earnings) (profits) (salaries) reasonably certain to be lost in
the future].
2. Medical Expense-Past and Future
The reasonable expense of necessary medical care, treatment, and
services received [and the present cash value of the reasonable ex-
penses of medical care, treatment and service reasonably certain to be
received in the future].
3. Caretaking Expense
The reasonable expense of necessary help in plaintiff's home, which
has been required as a result of his injury [and the present cash value
of such expense reasonably certain to be required in the future].
4. Loss of a Normal Life
Diminished ability to enjoy life that the plaintiff has experienced [and
diminished ability to enjoy life that the plaintiff is reasonably certain to
experience in the future].
5. Pain
Pain that the plaintiff has experienced [and pain that the plaintiff is
reasonably certain to experience in the future].
6. Physical Suffering
Physical suffering that the plaintiff has experienced [and physical suf-
fering that the plaintiff is reasonably certain to experience in the
future].
7. Inconvenience
The inconvenience that the plaintiff has experienced [and the incon-
venience that the plaintiff is reasonably certain to experience in the
future].
8. Mental Suffering
The mental suffering that the plaintiff has experienced [and the men-
tal suffering that the plaintiff is reasonably certain to experience in the
future].
9. Humiliation
Humiliation that the plaintiff has experienced [and humiliation that
the plaintiff is reasonably certain to experience in the future].
In addition, instructions on probable life expectancy and present cash
value will be required if the jury is instructed as to damages arising in the
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future. Where aggravation of pre-existing injury is supported by the evi-
dence, the following instruction should also be given:
Aggravation of Pre-Existing Ailment or Condition
Plaintiff's compensable injuries include the aggravation of any pre-
existing ailment or condition proved by the evidence to have resulted from
the negligence [wrongful conduct] of the defendant.
APPLICATION OF THE PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS
TO A HYPOTHETICAL PLAINTIFF
To understand the application of the elements of damage, it will be help-
ful to consider the damages that a hypothetical personal injury plaintiff might
recover. Suppose, for example, that the plaintiff is a thirty-five year old
police officer who is injured in an automobile accident caused by the defend-
ant's negligence. After three weeks in the hospital and nine months at
home recovering, the plaintiff is still unable to return to his job as a police
officer. However, he is able to assume a lower paying position as a security
guard.
The plaintiff's injuries, which include the loss of two fingers and the im-
paired functioning of his legs, are permanent. The plaintiff has continuing
pain in his legs, whose function can be expected to deteriorate in the future.
Furthermore, he no longer can engage in strenuous recreational activities,
although he once enjoyed swimming, playing tennis and baseball with his
children. Many activities that once seemed simple to the plaintiff, such as
getting in and out of his car, now have become inconvenient, physically
tiring and time consuming. Finally, the injury has reduced the plaintiff's life
expectancy by several years.
Plaintiff's injuries have resulted in several compensable elements of dam-
age, the measure of which will depend upon the jury's assessment of the
nature, extent, and duration of the injury. Although the plaintiff retains
some earning capacity as a security guard, it is less than it would have been
if he had continued his career as a police officer. Thus, the plaintiff can
recover damages not only for the earnings he lost prior to the jury's verdict,
but also for the reduction in his future earning capacity. The recovery for
future earnings loss will be based on the life expectancy the plaintiff would
have had if he had not been injured. 133 In addition, the plaintiff can re-
cover the medical expenses associated with the injury that he already has
incurred and is reasonably certain to incur in the future. 134 The recovery
for such future pecuniary losses will be reduced to present value. 135
133. See text accompanying notes 35-37 supra.
134. See text accompanying notes 38-43 supra.
135. See text accompanying note 26 supra.
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As non-pecuniary damages, the plaintiff can collect from the defendant for
the loss of a normal life. In support of recovery for this element, plaintiff's
counsel may argue that the plaintiff no longer can engage in the recreational
activities that he once enjoyed. For example, his capacity to enjoy his chil-
dren is now diminished. In addition, counsel can present evidence that the
plaintiff's enjoyment of life in his job as a security guard is much less than it
was in his career as a police officer.' 3 6
Aside from compensation for diminished enjoyment of life, the plaintiff
should be compensated for his past and future pain.' 3 7  Furthermore, be-
cause many activities have become difficult for the plaintiff, he will experi-
ence compensable physical suffering.13 8  The plaintiff also should be com-
pensated for the inconveniences that arise as a result of the injury.1 3 9 In
addition, the plaintiff may suffer compensable humiliation because of his dis-
figurement and the impairment in the use of his legs. 1 40  Finally, the plain-
tiff should be compensated for mental suffering which has occurred and is
reasonably certain to occur in the future.141 The plaintiff as a practical mat-
ter, although not as of right, probably will be allowed to recover non-
pecuniary damages for his "lost years." 142 His recovery of non-pecuniary
damages will not be reduced to present value. 14 3
Based on the proposed jury instructions and the arguments of counsel, the
jury should be able to understand that each element of damage is distinct.
The recovery for future pain, for example, is independent of the recovery for
the mental suffering that the plaintiff will endure because of the prospect of
future pain. Similarly, the jury should comprehend that the plaintiff may
independently recover for any mental suffering caused by his inability to
lead a normal life.
CONCLUSION
In awarding damages for personal injury, the goal is fair and just compen-
sation of the injured party. To guide the jury in assessing damages, most
jurisdictions have developed instructions that itemize the elements of dam-
age. In the jury instructions currently employed, however, the itemized
elements of damage often overlap. Accordingly, attorneys may be arguing for
recovery of the same element of damage under two separate labels, creating
a danger of overcompensating the personal injury plaintiff. The danger of
overcompensation is particularly acute in light of the "blackboard" argument,
which permits attorneys to show the jury a list of the compensable elements
136. See text accompanying notes 102-104 supra.
137. See text accompanying notes 52-54 supra.
138. See text accompanying notes 55-61 supra.
139. See text accompanying notes 62-64 supra.
140. See text accompanying notes 72-78 supra.
141. See text accompanying notes 65-78 supra.
142. See text accompanying notes 84-89 supra.
143. See text accompanying note 81 supra.
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of damage with a dollar recovery assigned to each element. The jury instruc-
tions now employed also may foster undercompensation by failing to isolate
those elements of damage worthy of individual consideration by the trier of
fact.
This Article has outlined a framework of personal injury damages so that
both court and counsel can understand the elements of damage that properly
are recoverable. In addition, a set of jury instructions in which the elements
of damage are distinct has been proposed. Applying the framework of dam-
ages presented, plaintiffs should be compensated fairly for their damages and
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